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Abstract: This theoretical note examines the usefulness of the Pigouvian tax policy in 
dealing with negative production externalities and in improving social welfare in a 
small developing economy. A two-sector, full-employment general equilibrium model 
with exogenous labour market imperfection is used for the analytical purpose where 
the sector that faces an imperfect labour market creates pollution through its 
production and lowers the efficiency of workers. The analysis finds that the socially 
optimal Pigouvian tax rate may not necessarily be positive and that it crucially hinges 
both on the degree of labour market imperfection and the scale of negative 
externalities that production of the dirty commodity generates. 
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Negative Production Externalities and Efficacy of the Pigouvian Tax 
Policy in a Developing Economy: A Pure Economic Argument 
 
1.  Introduction and motivation 
 
A standard welfare result in the small open economy literature is that a Pigouvian 
production tax is an effective instrument to take care of negative externalities 
emanated through production of a commodity. There are no other distortions in the 
economy and commodity prices are given internationally. The simple economic 
argument is that such a tax on producers would lower production of the dirty 
commodity and divert economic resources towards production of good commodities. 
The tax does not affect consumer prices and the amount of excess demand for the 
commodity by the consumers can easily be met through import of the good from the 
international market at a given price. The tax revenue collected by the government is 
transferred to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Hence, the socially optimal tax rate 
in a small open economy is unambiguously positive. We here set aside the problems 
relating to measurement and implementation of the tax mechanism and other 
alternatives to deal with negative production externalities and concentrate on 
Pigouvian tax principle solely from the perspective of social welfare.1 
 
Two pertinent questions at this juncture are as follows. (i) Is the optimal Pigouvian 
tax in a small open economy in the presence of other distortion(s) e.g. labour market 
distortion also necessarily positive?; and, (ii) does the sign of the optimal tax anyhow 

1
 For issues relating to measurement and implementation problems of the tax principle 
and its alternatives one may go through Baumol (1972), Boettke (2012), Vaughn (1980), 
Barthold (1994), Coase (1960), Carlton and Loury (1980), Kohn (1986), Fullerton (1997), 
Fullerton and Metcalf (1998), Bovenberg and Mooij (1994), Goulder, Parry and Burtraw 
(1997), Sandmo (2008)  etc. 
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depend on the magnitude of negative externalities that the production of the dirty 
good generates? 
 
This theoretical note attempts to provide answers to the above questions in terms of a 
2×2 full-employment small open economy model with exogenous labour market 
imperfection. The import-competing sector (sector 2) produces a manufacturing 
commodity that causes health hazards; thereby lowering the efficiency of the workers. 
In sector 2, workers receive an exogenously given higher wage than their counterparts 
in sector 1.€2  Thus, we have exogenous labour market imperfection. There is a 
Pigouvian production tax on sector 2 in the scenario, which aims at tackling negative 
externalities, generated by production of commodity 2. In this setting, we have shown 
that the socially optimal Pigouvian tax although lowers the degree of labour market 
distortion may not necessarily be positive and crucially hinges both on the degree of 
labour market imperfection and the scale of negative externalities that production of 
the dirty commodity generates. We also point out that if the degree of dirtiness of the 
commodity is sufficiently high there may arise a perverse case where the socially 
optimal Pigouvian tax rate could be negative even in the absence of any labour market 
imperfection. 
 
 
2.  The Model  
 
A small, open economy is considered with two sectors: agriculture (sector 1) and 
manufacturing (sector 2). Sector 1 is an informal sector that produces an agricultural 
commodity, 1X  by means of labour ( L ) and capital of type K . Sector 2 is the formal 
sector producing a final manufacturing commodity, 2X  using the same two 
homogeneous inputs. Both the inputs are perfectly mobile across sectors. Sector 2 

2
 Implementation of the minimum wage law, trade unionism etc. could be the reason. 
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faces an imperfect, labour market where workers receive an exogenously given wage, 
*W while the wage rate in the informal sector, W , is market determined with *W W>
. The labour allocation mechanism is as follows. Workers first compete for getting 
jobs in sector 2 where the wage rate is high. However, those who cannot get 
employment in that sector are automatically absorbed in sector 1 providing the 
competitive and low wage. Hence, we have exogenous labour market distortion.  
 
Sector 1 is assumed to be non-polluting 3 , but the production of commodity 2 
generates pollution that affects the efficiency of workers. It is assumed that the 
efficiency of a representative worker, h , is inversely related to the level of pollution 
in the economy. Environmental pollution leads to health hazards4, thus adversely 
affecting the worker’s efficiency. Although in this model the manufacturing sector 
creates pollution, it is assumed that pollution affects the efficiency of not only those 
workers engaged in sector 2 but the entire workforce. This is because both the sectors 
operate at close vicinity so that environmental degradation affects the entire working 
population equally. Thus, the average efficiency of the workers, h , is considered to be 
a positive function of the total amount of production of commodity 2 and is given by 
2( ); (.) 0h h X h′= <
         (1) 
Since the production of the manufacturing commodity creates external diseconomies 
its free market production is not optimal and therefore, there should be a Pigouvian 

3
 This is a simplifying assumption. A typical agricultural sector also vitiates the environment 
through use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. However, the amount of pollution 
generated by the agricultural sector is insignificant relative to that produced by the 
manufacturing sector.  
 
4
 For example, air pollution can lead to irritation, breathing problems and lung diseases; water 
pollution causes contaminated drinking water; improper waste disposal management involves 
significant human pathogens. All these contribute directly to reduce productive efficiency of 
workers. 
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production tax from the perspective of social welfare. The producers have to pay a 
production tax at the ad-valorem rate, z  for the production of commodity 2. Hence, 
the effective price of commodity 2 received by its producers is *2 2 (1 )P P z= − .  
 
Sector 1 is the export sector while sector 2 is the import-competing sector. 
Commodities prices are given by the small open economy assumption. We assume 
sector 2 to be capital-intensive in value sense which in turn implies that 
2 1
2 1*
K K
L L
a a
W a Wa
> . Here jia  denotes requirement of the j th input required to produce 1 
unit of output of the i th sector for ,j L K=  and 1, 2i = . All other assumptions of the 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model including CRS with positive but diminishing 
marginal productivity to each input holds. Labour is measured in efficiency unit. 
Finally, commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire.  
 
It should be pointed out at this stage that sector 2 uses 2 2La X  efficiency units of 
labour apart from capital in its production to produce 2X  units of commodity 2. The 
production of commodity 2, lowers the average efficiency of the workers through 
generation of pollution. If 2X  rises by one per cent, sector 2 employs 2Lλ  per cent of 
the labour force additionally while it lowers the labour force in efficiency unit by hε  
per cent at the margin, where 2
2
(.)( . ) 0(.)h
Xdh
dX h
ε = < is the elasticity of the labour 
efficiency function, 2( )h X , with respect to 2X and 2Lλ is the proportion of effective 
labour endowment (measured in efficiency unit) employed in sector2. Hence, 
effectively sector 2 utilizes 2( )  L hλ ε+  proportion of the total labour force of the 
economy measured in efficiency unit. Hence, sector 2 in effect uses more labour vis-
à-vis what it directly requires in production. This gives rise to the necessity of 
classifying sectors in terms of efficiency adjusted physical sense. 
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Because *W W> , our assumption that sector 2 is more capital-intensive relative to 
sector 1 in value sense automatically implies that sector 2 is capital-intensive in 
physical sense as well i.e.
 
2 1
2 1
K K
L L
λ λ
λ λ> . However, here only direct labour uses in 
production are taken into consideration. We concentrate on the case where sector 2 is 
more capital-intensive than sector 1 even in efficiency-adjusted physical sense i.e. 
2 1
2 1
( ) ( )K K
L h L
λ λ
λ ε λ>+ . It is not problematic to assume sector 2 to be capital-intensive in 
both value sense and efficiency-adjusted physical sense so long as hε is low. 
Problems arise when hε is sufficiently high so that sector 2 becomes labour-intensive 
in efficiency-adjusted physical sense. It is not difficult to check intuitively that the 
results get altered in this peculiar case. 
 
2.1  The general equilibrium structure 
 
3. Comparative statics 
 
Totally, differentiating equations (2) – (5) the following proposition can easily be 
derived. 
Proposition 1: A Pigouvian production tax on commodity 2 leads to:  (i) a decrease 
in the return to capital, r ; (ii) an increase in the competitive wage,W ; (iii) a reduction 
in intersectoral wage differential; (iv) increases in wage-rental ratios; (v) an expansion 
(a contraction) of sector 1 (sector 2); and, (vi) a decrease in the number of workers 
employed in sector 2, 2 2 2( )LL a X= .  
 
Proposition 2: An increase in the ad-valorem rate of production tax on commodity 2 
worsens welfare if 2 2 (.) hzP X Wh L ε≥ .    
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Proposition 3: The socially optimal Pigouvian tax is negative (zero) (positive) iff 
2( * ) ( )( ) hW W L WhL ε− > = < .  
 
Proposition 4: The probability, that the Pigouvian tax policy would be effective in 
addressing the problem of negative externalities and improve social welfare, increases 
with an increase in the degree of dirtiness of the commodity. This possibility also 
increases if the tax policy is accompanied by a policy of labour market reform. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
In this theoretical note, we have shown that in a small developing economy with 
labour market imperfection the socially optimal pigouvian tax may not necessarily be 
positive. We have used a two-sector, full-employment model with exogenous labour 
market imperfection for analytical purpose. The import-competing sector (sector 2) 
produces a commodity that causes health hazards and lowers the efficiency of workers 
in the economy. In sector 2 workers receive a fixed wage which is greater than the 
competitive wage in sector 1. Hence, there are two distortions in our model: labour 
market distortion reflected in intersectoral wage differential and negative externalities 
generated from production of commodity 2. In this setting, we have shown that a 
Pigouvian production tax may not be the right instrument to deal with negative 
externalities and improve social welfare. The socially optimal tax rate can indeed be 
negative depending on relative strengths of two opposite effects. Most importantly, 
the degree of dirtiness of the commodity, whose production emanates negative 
externalities, plays a very crucial role in determining the sign of the socially optimal 
tax rate.  
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